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In June 2017, the US Senate voted 98–2 to 
pass a bill designed to strengthen existing 
US sanctions against Russia, including 
a provision that would allow sanctions 
against those who provide capital, 
services, or other support to projects 
that build, expand, or even maintain 
Russian energy export pipelines.1 The fact 
that US policymakers are now openly 
debating extraterritorial measures to 
punish those who facilitate Russian energy 
exports suggests the two countries’ geo-
economic frictions could escalate, with 
commensurate impacts for E&Ps, service 
companies, and capital providers. 
 Transatlantic disputes over projects 
like the proposed Nord Stream-2 (NS-2) 
pipeline—which would increase Russian  
gas supplies to Europe—will likely continue 
for years to come, as US-Russia geopolitical 
competition intensifies and the political 
toxicity of Russia-related matters rises in 
Washington. Accordingly, this brief aims 
to inform and contextualize the discussion 
by (1) quantifying the potential exposure of 
key European countries to Russian gas price 
and supply manipulation, (2) showing how 
Moscow has used energy as an instrument 
of coercive diplomacy since the early 
1990s, and (3) briefly assessing the impacts 
and future policy implications of Russian 
entities’ past use of the “energy weapon” 
in and near Europe.
THE DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON 
RUSSIAN GAS, BY COUNTRY
Europe-Russia energy security discussions 
often focus on natural gas because 
manipulating crude oil and refined product 
supplies is generally a less effective tactic. 
Crude and related products are each 
traded in highly fungible global markets, 
so substitute supplies can be procured and 
transported relatively easily in the event 
that Russian exports are interrupted. By 
comparison, lower fungibility has historically 
constrained work-around options in the 
event of natural gas supply disruptions. In 
particular, Central and Eastern European 
consumers’ lower connectivity to LNG and 
other potential replacement gas sources 
has perpetuated dependency on Russian 
supplies and made pipelines a natural 
strategic fulcrum for the Kremlin. 
 This analysis focuses on key members 
of the EU and/or NATO that could be 
subject to gas supply manipulations as 
part of a Russian attempt to drive a wedge 
between Washington and its core European 
partners. Therefore, not all countries in 
NATO, or what is often politically defined as 
“Europe,” are included. 
 Russian gas imports equaled 23% 
of total UK gas demand in 2016, 25% in 
France, 40% in Italy, 55% in Denmark, 
58% in the Czech Republic, 62% in 
If Gazprom truly 
prioritized commercial 
concerns over political 
ones, we would expect 
to see more consistent 
use of legal processes 
to enforce agreements 
and settle disputes and 
fewer questionably 
timed price increases 
and supply curtailments.
“Regardless of how the standoff over Ukraine develops, one lesson is clear: excessive 
dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak.” 
—Donald Tusk, former prime minister of Poland (April 2014)
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INSTANCES OF RUSSIAN ENERGY 
COERCION IN EUROPE AND THE 
FORMER SOVIET ZONE
The Kremlin’s use of energy coercion began 
even before the USSR actually dissolved in 
December 1991. For instance, it interrupted 
oil supplies to the Baltic states in 1990 in 
an effort to crush the region’s budding 
independence movements, although to 
no avail.3 Russian energy companies—
presumably with the Kremlin’s blessing—
have gone on to make multiple attempts 
over the past 25 years to use energy 
supplies to gain leverage over Russia’s 
neighbors and advance Moscow’s strategic 
priorities. The author has identified at 
Germany and Hungary, 64% in Poland, 
70% in Austria, and 84% in Slovakia, 
according to data from BP and Russian 
gas producer Gazprom. If the NS-2 project 
comes online, dependence on Russian gas 
in Germany and surrounding countries 
could rise significantly. The Nord Stream-1 
pipeline alone supplied gas volumes 
equivalent to 55% of Germany’s total gas 
consumption in 2016. If German nuclear 
power plants shut down on schedule and 
NS-2 comes online in the 2019–2020 time 
frame, Russia’s direct gas links to Germany 
could by themselves supply more than 
80% of German gas consumption even  
at a relatively low pipeline utilization rate 
for NS-2.2
NOTE  “Dependence” is determined by percentage of direct Russian imports divided by total annual gas demand. Ukraine now uses reverse flows from neighboring 
states , so its Russian-origin gas supplies are “indirect.” 
SOURCES  BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017; GADM (countries); Gazprom (pipeline routes and gas import data)
FIGURE 1 — KEY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES’ DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS
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least 15 discrete instances where Russian 
entities used price and physical volume 
manipulation of crude oil or natural gas 
supplies—often amid political tensions—to 
pressure consumers located in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
countries (Figure 2). 
 The “true” number of energy supply 
disruptions Russian entities have caused 
in and around the former Soviet zone is 
likely significantly higher than the number 
reported in this study. Consider, for instance, 
that in 1998 and 1999 alone, Russian oil 
producer Lukoil interrupted supplies of 
crude oil to Lithuania’s Mažeikiai refinery 
at least nine times amid a contest between 
American and Russian interests to acquire 
a stake in the facility.4 Smaller disruptions 
are not always necessarily reported, or they 
may instead be cast as “commercial” or 
“technical” disputes—even though many 
have political overtones.
 Price conflicts and debts owed by 
customers—frequently exacerbated by 
unilateral gas price increases imposed by 
Gazprom—often become the pretext for 
supply curtailment. Such moves are part of 
a messaging campaign in which ostensibly 
commercial factors are used to legitimize 
gas price and/or supply manipulations that, 
in many instances, are motivated more 
by geopolitics than by concerns about 
corporate profitability. 
 For instance, over the course of 
less than a week in late March and early 
April 2014, Gazprom raised the price of 
gas exports to Ukraine from $268.5 per 
thousand cubic meters (mcm) to $385.5 
per mcm, and ultimately to $485 per 
mcm.5 This rapid price increase was 
suspiciously timed—coming on the heels 
of Russia’s invasion of Crimea—and 
transcends the bounds of commercial 
normalcy. Gazprom cited Ukraine’s unpaid 
gas debts as justification for the price hike, 
yet Ukraine had consistently owed Gazprom 
substantial unpaid sums for gas deliveries 
since the January 2009 supply crisis was 
resolved and Gazprom had not previously 
made significant, sudden changes to gas 
pricing for supplies into Ukraine.6 Similarly, 
the timing of “technical difficulties” in an 
oil pipeline supplying a specific refinery 
or export terminal is deeply suspicious 
when the troubles just happen to coincide 
with the rejection of a Russian suitor’s 
acquisition attempt.7 
 Commercial gas suppliers are certainly 
within their rights to terminate supplies to 
consumers that have breached contractual 
terms by being in arrears.8 Yet the time 
periods in which a commercial gas supplier 
in the European marketplace would usually 
allow a customer to remain in breach of 
the agreement are short—sometime only 
seven days from the time the supplier puts 
the consumer on notice.9 Commercially 
minded gas suppliers expect a rapid and 
meaningful resolution of contract breaches. 
The transparent, punctual, and predictable 
processes they prefer to resolve disputes are 
a hallmark of standard commercial behavior.
 Gazprom, in contrast, tolerates 
massive debts on the part of certain 
customers such as Naftogaz of Ukraine for 
years, then suddenly imposes stringent 
payment requirements and raises prices 
when geopolitical tensions increase 
between the Russian government and 
the consumer government. The Russian 
company’s inconsistent oscillation between 
forbearance and sharp, severe price and/
or supply changes that closely correspond 
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Instances involving crude oil are shaded gray; those involving natural gas are shaded blue. 
Interruptions that caused systemic effects on oil or gas supplies in Europe occured during the years highlighted in orange.
FIGURE 2 — KNOWN OR PROBABLE POLITICALLY DRIVEN ENERGY 
SUPPLY OR PRICE MANIPULATIONS BY RUSSIA (1990–2015)
SOURCES  BBC; FOI; Keith Smith; Reuters; The New York Times
Policymakers’ aversion 
to the potential short-
term losses caused by 
a gas supply cutoff or a 
politically driven price 
increase could expose 
them to manipulation, 
undermine their resolve 
to stand up to Russian 
revanchism in and near 
Europe, and, ultimately, 
divide and weaken the 
EU and NATO.
4RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 07.18.17
immediate aftermath of supply and price 
disruptions, the directly affected countries 
have sometimes had to make tactical 
concessions to Moscow—such as Ukraine 
paying higher prices for gas in the wake 
of the 2009 shutoff, or then-president of 
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma’s decision to accept 
gas debt forgiveness in exchange for allowing 
Russia to retain most of the Black Sea naval 
fleet after a September 1993 gas shutoff.12 
 Yet over a longer time frame, the 
perception that energy supplies have been 
politicized can induce consumers to either 
move to new energy sources entirely, or 
at least to diversify their energy sources 
to reduce exposure to future volume and 
price risks arising from a single supplier. 
Energy supply and price manipulation in the 
former Soviet zone has generally driven the 
targeted countries further from Moscow’s 
orbit. Historical examples of national 
responses to Russian energy coercion—
such as the Lithuanian and Ukrainian 
experiences—suggest that after a period 
of initial disruption, traders and consumers 
generally rebuild supply channels in ways 
that are more resilient and diversified, and 
less directly reliant on Russian suppliers.
 In the most extreme cases, using 
the “energy weapon” may have actually 
backfired by precipitating additional anti-
to geopolitical events disturbs consumers 
and reduces their confidence in Russia as 
a reliable energy supplier. If Gazprom (and 
ultimately, the Kremlin) truly prioritized 
commercial concerns over political ones, 
we would expect to see more frequent 
and consistent use of legal processes to 
enforce agreements and settle disputes 
(i.e., court and arbitration cases) and fewer 
questionably timed price increases and 
supply curtailments.
 Gazprom’s choices can create serious 
consequences for gas consumers further 
down the pipeline in Europe. At least three 
of the gas supply manipulations shown in 
Figure 2 caused systemic disruptions deep 
into Europe—particularly the January 2009 
gas shutoff that Gazprom instituted due to 
Ukraine’s gas debt, which caused pressure 
drops as far west as France and forced 
businesses and schools across southeastern 
Europe to shut down amid severe cold.11 
HOW EFFECTIVE HAS RUSSIAN ENERGY 
COERCION BEEN IN ACHIEVING 
MOSCOW’S STRATEGIC AIMS?
Energy supply disruptions can, in the short 
term, cause firms and consumers to incur 
significant economic losses, which can then 
become social problems as well. And in the 
Russia has 
demonstrated a  
rising appetite for 
taking strategic risks, 
and it would be naive  
to think that the 
Kremlin is not willing  
to unleash a “bolt from 
the blue” in the natural 
gas supply realm. 
NOTE  Question mark indicates that the effectiveness of Russia’s use of the “energy weapon” to achieve its policy objectives was unclear. 
SOURCES  Karen Smith Stegen;10 author’s analysis of Gazprom export volume data
FIGURE 3 — DID RUSSIAN ENERGY COERCION ACHIEVE MOSCOW’S STRATEGIC GOALS?
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Georgia Belarus Ukraine
Pr
ec
on
di
tio
ns
Exporter consolidates control of  
energy resources ü ü ü ü ü ü
State control over export routes ü ü ü ü ü ü
Exporter carries out price hikes  
and/or supply disruptions ü ü ü ü ü ü
Re
su
lts
Target state acquiesces/concedes  
to exporter state demands û û û û ? û
Target state diversifies energy supply 
sources after initial coercion attempts ü ü ü ü û ü
5RUSSIA’S USE OF THE “ENERGY WEAPON” IN EUROPE
Russia sentiments in countries such as 
Ukraine and Georgia, which emerged 
from domestic political revolutions with 
a generally pro-Western, pro-Europe 
orientation. Despite multiple energy 
coercion actions, both Ukraine and Georgia 
eventually experienced armed conflict with 
Russian military forces and Russian-backed 
proxies, and the outcomes of these conflicts 
have generally proven muddled at best for 
Russian interests.
 For example, Ukraine and Lithuania 
have moved decisively to reduce direct 
gas imports from Russia over the past five 
years (Figure 4). Ukraine has done so by 
increasing its imports of gas from Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland via new pipeline 
interconnections that allow “reverse flows” 
of gas from west to east at scale for the 
first time.13 Baseload gas supplies in Central 
Europe still typically come from Russia but 
are also often intermingled with volumes 
from Norway and the Netherlands as 
pipeline connectivity improves. The mixing 
of gas molecules makes it much harder for 
Gazprom to single out specific consumer 
countries for volume—or especially price—
manipulation. 
 In effect, Ukraine has substantively 
unlinked itself from direct imports of 
Gazprom molecules but can still procure 
Russian-origin gas. To boot, the price of 
reverse flow gas supplies is ultimately 
determined largely by trading on 
European hubs, rather than by Gazprom’s 
monopolistic pricing. European hub prices 
can be volatile, but thus far this appears 
to be a cost Ukraine is willing to pay to 
distance itself from Gazprom.14
 For its part, Lithuania’s Klaipėdos Nafta 
has leased a floating LNG regasification 
and storage vessel from Norway’s Höegh 
LNG for a 10-year term, with the option 
of purchasing the vessel once the lease 
expires.15 The terminal can potentially 
regasify approximately 4 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) per year, which is roughly 
twice Lithuania’s total annual gas needs; 
in 2016, it sent out 1.46 bcm of gas.16 The 
effects on Lithuanian gas security have 
been significant, as the country is now 
much less vulnerable to a cutoff of gas 
SOURCES  Gazprom; Naftogaz of Ukraine
FIGURE 4 — CHANGE IN UKRAINE AND LITHUANIA’S DIRECT GAS 
IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA (2000–2016)
0
+50
-50
-100
+100
+150
supplies from Russia and also gets better 
prices for the volumes it still purchases 
from Gazprom. Indeed, once Lithuania’s 
Litgas signed a term sheet with Norway’s 
Statoil for the procurement of LNG, 
Gazprom quickly responded with a 23% 
discount on gas prices.17 The discount 
helped bring Lithuania’s gas prices from 
among the highest in Europe down to a 
more market-driven level.
 Perhaps the most critical challenges 
of additional Russian gas supplies into 
Europe from the NS-2 pipeline arise in 
the political arena. Plentiful gas supplies 
today have impeded attempts to build 
the infrastructure necessary to ensure 
long-term, strategic European gas supply 
security. For instance, French regulators 
said in 2016 that “there is no economic 
need” for an interconnector pipeline 
crossing the Pyrenees that would help 
better integrate Spain’s substantial LNG 
regasification capacity with the broader 
European market, citing “stable demand 
and overcapacity in recent years.”18
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THE WILD CARD: RUSSIAN USE OF 
ENERGY COERCION AGAINST A MAJOR 
WESTERN EUROPEAN CONSUMER
The current dataset lacks information on 
the most critical potential scenario for 
energy security planners and analysts: 
namely, what could happen if Russia 
targeted a larger country that, militarily 
and economically speaking, is systemically 
important to Europe. Ukraine and Georgia 
did not rise to this level, but Germany, 
which is poised to dramatically increase 
its intake of Russian gas through a direct 
bilateral linkage, does. In such cases, the 
target country’s economic importance and 
leadership role in Europe would potentially 
magnify the impact of “tactical” concessions 
and confer strategic importance on them. 
 Policymakers’ visceral aversion to the 
potential short-term losses caused by a gas 
supply cutoff or a politically driven price 
increase could—particularly if dependence 
on Russian gas increases—expose them to 
manipulation, undermine their resolve to 
stand up to Russian revanchism in and near 
Europe, and, ultimately, divide and weaken 
the EU and NATO.20
  The psychological reality that the 
anticipated risk and pain of a potential 
future event are worse than if the event 
actually happens matters to the Russia 
gas dependency discussion for at least 
three core reasons. First, increased 
Western European dependence on Russian 
gas would raise questions about the 
willingness of some of those countries to 
aid smaller Central and Eastern European 
nations, such as the Baltics, in the case 
of Russian aggression or subversion. This 
dynamic is especially meaningful because 
the robustness of the United States’ 
strategic commitment to NATO—which has 
traditionally been the alliance’s bulwark—
has been called into question on multiple 
occasions by President Donald Trump. 
History suggests Moscow believes it can get 
away with singling out smaller countries, 
as when Russian state-owned oil pipeline 
company Transneft disrupted oil supplies 
to Lithuania in 2006 with impunity, even 
 Failing to deepen Spain’s connection 
to Europe’s emerging gas hub architecture 
is a serious blow to supply diversification 
efforts. Spain’s six operational LNG receiving 
terminals and seventh mothballed facility 
have a total annual sendout capacity of 
nearly 69 bcm of gas per year.19 Spain only 
consumed 28 bcm of gas in 2016, which 
suggests that if pipeline infrastructure 
permitted, the country could boost LNG 
terminal utilization and serve as a gateway 
for non-Russian gas into Europe. Spanish 
LNG use peaks in the winter. Using the 
maximum peak in the past five years as 
the “set point” for determining sustainable 
spare sendout capability suggests that if 
prices rendered the trade economic and 
there was enough infrastructure capacity 
to ship the gas, nearly 33 bcm per year of 
additional gas could be sent from Spanish 
LNG terminals into the European market 
without threatening their ability to serve 
local consumers (Figure 5).
SOURCE  Gas Infrastructure Europe 
NOTE  Data converted from gigawatt hours (GWh) to millions of cubic meters (MMcm) using a 
conversion factor of 0.1 MMcm/GWh on Gasunie unit converter.
FIGURE 5 — ACTUAL DAILY GAS SENDOUT FROM SPAIN’S LNG 
TERMINALS VS. THEORETICAL CAPACITY (2012–PRESENT)
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natural gas supply realm. Planning and 
physically preparing for such a contingency 
can help deter future attempts by Russia to 
use gas as a coercive instrument in Western 
Europe, but Nord Stream-2 risks further 
weakening Western Europe’s resolve to take 
such measures in a timely fashion.
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